Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime by Stemen, Don
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Criminal Justice & Criminology: Faculty
Publications & Other Works Faculty Publications
1-2007
Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for
Reducing Crime
Don Stemen
Loyola University Chicago, dstemen@luc.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminal
Justice & Criminology: Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please
contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
© VERA Institute of Justice, 2007.
Recommended Citation
Stemen, D. "Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime." Federal Sentencing Reporter 19(4), 2007.
Reconsidering Incarceration:
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January 2007
By Don Stemen
Director of Research, Center on Sentencing and Corrections
From the director
After falling for more than a decade, in many parts 
of the United States crime rates appear to be inch-
ing up again. Although it is still too early to call this 
a trend, it is not hard to imagine this shift in direction 
leading to calls for tougher sentences and more incar-
ceration—even though our prisons are already full and 
corrections in many states already absorbs so much of 
the available resources.
the last time we embarked down this path, there 
was little empirical evidence showing that jails and 
prisons represented the best way to reduce crime. 
today, in contrast, researchers have so much data to 
draw on that, for anyone not schooled in research pro-
tocols and analysis, it can sometimes seem like there’s 
too much information.
this report from don Stemen, director of research 
in Vera’s center on Sentencing and corrections, seeks 
to make sense of the current body of research literature 
on the relationship between crime and incarceration. 
As a comparison and analysis of what we now know 
about the relationship between crime and incarcera-
tion, it should help policymakers and others understand 
information that is complex, and sometimes seemingly 
contradictory. however, it also goes a step further, 
examining research in related fields that suggest alter-
natives to incarceration that promise similar or better 
results—sometimes at lower cost.
this report could not be more timely. For the past 
several years, political leaders on both sides of the aisle 
have been looking for cost-effective ways to increase 
public safety. Given the pragmatic demands of our 
times, we hope this report provides much needed 
guidance on the optimal use of incarceration, as well 
as alternative investment choices.
michael P. Jacobson
director, Vera institute of Justice
execUtiVe SUmmAry
current research on the relationship between incar-
ceration and crime provides confusing and even 
contradictory guidance for policymakers. the most 
sophisticated analyses generally agree that increased 
incarceration rates have some effect on reducing 
crime, but the scope of that impact is limited: a 10 per-
cent increase in incarceration is associated with a 2 to 
4 percent drop in crime. moreover, analysts are nearly 
unanimous in their conclusion that continued growth 
in incarceration will prevent considerably fewer, if any, 
crimes than past increases did and will cost taxpayers 
substantially more to achieve.
these outcomes raise the question of whether or 
not further increases in incarceration offer the most 
effective and efficient strategy for combating crime. 
Additional research examined in this report reveals 
several other variables that have also been shown to 
have a relationship with lower crime rates. An increase 
in the number of police per capita, a reduction in 
unemployment, and increases in real wage rates and 
education have all been shown to be associated with 
lower rates of crime.
Although these latter findings do not necessarily 
indicate a cause and effect relationship, they do sug-
gest that policymakers with limited resources should 
weigh the modest benefits of more incarceration 
against potentially greater reductions in crime that 
might be realized from investing in other areas. 
in the 1970s the United States embarked on one of the largest policy 
experiments of the 20th century—the expanded use of incarceration to 
achieve greater public safety. Between 1970 and 2005, state and federal 
authorities increased prison populations by 628 percent.1 By 2005, 
more than 1.5 million persons were incarcerated in U.S. prisons on any 
given day, and an additional 750,000 were incarcerated in local jails.2 
By the turn of the 21st century, more than 5.6 million living Americans 
had spent time in a state or federal prison—nearly 3 percent of the U.S. 
population.3 having so many people imprisoned over the course of 30 
years raises an obvious question: has this experiment worked? 
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the most sophisticated studies available generally agree that increased 
incarceration rates have some impact on reducing crime rates, but the scope of 
that impact is limited.4 For example, while the U.S. experienced a dramatic drop in 
crime between 1992 and 1997, imprisonment was responsible for just 25 percent 
of that reduction.5 Seventy-five percent of the crime drop through the 1990s was 
attributable to factors other than incarceration.6 As a result, many commentators 
argue that the pivotal question for policymakers is not “does incarceration increase 
public safety?” but rather, “is incarceration the most effective way to increase 
public safety?” 
the emerging answer to the rephrased query is “no.” Analysts are nearly unanimous 
in their conclusion that continued growth in incarceration will prevent considerably 
fewer, if any, crimes—and at substantially greater cost to taxpayers.7 in the future, 
policing strategies, unemployment, wages, education, and other factors associated 
with low crime rates may account for more significant reductions. yet, policy and 
spending for public safety continue to focus heavily on imprisonment, effectively 
limiting investment in these promising alternatives.   
this paper seeks to help officials understand the complexities and limitations 
of current research on incarceration and crime in the United States. it also 
examines research on several of the other factors that might be developed as 
part of an expanded notion of public safety.8 informed by this more inclusive 
understanding of current research, it suggests that effective public safety strategies 
should move away from an exclusive focus on incarceration to embrace other 
factors associated with low crime rates in a more comprehensive policy framework 
for safeguarding citizens.
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Estimating the Impact of Incarceration 
on Crime 
Research has consistently shown crime rates to be affected by many factors, 
including economics, social and demographic characteristics, culture, politics, 
and incarceration rates. To date, policymakers’ emphasis on incarceration for 
reducing crime has been premised, largely, on theories about its influence in 
incapacitating active offenders and deterring would-be offenders. However, 
thanks to rapid increases in crime and imprisonment through the 1970s and 
1980s, followed by a sharp decrease in crime in the 1990s, we now have a 
large body of recent empirical work on the effects of incarceration to draw on 
as well.9 
Much of this research seeks to quantify the association between the size of 
a jurisdiction’s incarceration rate and its crime rate.10 Led primarily by econ-
omists, these analyses have become increasingly sophisticated, examining 
many factors and looking at data across jurisdictions and over long periods 
of time.11 Much of this research has confirmed a relationship between higher 
incarceration rates and lower crime rates. However, as Table 1 summarizes, 
recent studies vary widely in their conclusions about how strong this relation-
ship is and, in some cases, whether it really exists after all.12
For example, using national-level data, researchers have found that a 10 per-
cent higher incarceration rate is associated with anywhere from a 9 percent to a 
22 percent lower crime rate.13 In contrast, analyses using state-level data found 
a weaker association, concluding that a 10 percent increase in incarceration is 
associated with a crime rate that is anywhere from 0.11 percent to 4 percent 
lower.14 Similar estimates have been generated from studies using county-level 
data, ranging from a 2 percent to a 4 percent crime-rate difference.15 Moreover, 
several studies have found no relationship between incarceration rates and 
crime rates.16 One study even found that higher incarceration rates were asso-
ciated with higher crime rates in states with already high incarceration rates 
(incarceration rates above 325 inmates per 100,000 population).17
As these disparate findings suggest, the impact of incarceration on crime 
is inconsistent from one study to the next. One could use available research to 
argue that a 10 percent increase in incarceration is associated with no differ-
ence in crime rates, a 22 percent lower index crime rate, or a decrease only in 
the rate of property crime.18 Therefore, to be guided by the available empirical 
research, policymakers clearly need to develop a more nuanced understanding 
of the literature. 
Studies that do not account for simultaneity
Study	 Data		 Estimated	percentage	change	in	crime	rates			
	 	 due	to	a	10%	increase	in	incarceration	rates
Devine, Sheley, and Smith (1988)19 National — 1948–1985
 –28.4 (violent offenses)
  –19.9 (property offenses)
  –22.0 (index offenses)
Marvell and Moody (1997, 1998)20 National — 1958–1995
 –7.9 (violent offenses)
  –9.5 (property offenses)
  –9.3 (index offenses)
Marvell and Moody (1994)21 49 states — 1971–1989 –1.6 (index offenses)
Besci (1999)22 50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
 –0.46 (violent offenses)
  –0.91 (property offenses)
  –0.87 (index offenses)
Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer (2001)23 50 states — 1971–1997  not significant (violent offenses)
  –1.1 (property offenses)
Donahue and Levitt (2001)24 50 states — 1973–1997  not significant (violent offenses)
  –1.6 (property offenses)
Levitt (2001)25 50 states — 1950–1999 –0.76 (property offenses)
  –1.3 (violent offenses)
DeFina and Arvanites (2002)26 50 states and D.C. — 1971–1998
 
 not signifiant (murder, rape, assault, robbery)
  –1.1 (burglary)
  –0.56 (larceny)
  –1.4 (auto theft)
Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)27 57 Florida counties — 1980–1998  not significant (index offenses)
Washington State Institute    
for Public Policy (2003)28 39 Washington counties — 1980–2001 –2.4 (index offenses) 
Liedka, Piehl, and Useem (2006)29 50 states and D.C. — 1970–2000
 –0.118 (index offenses)     
  (states with incarceration rates <325)  
  +0.05 (index offenses)   
  (states with incarceration rates >325)
Kovandzic and Vieraitis (2006)30 58 Florida counties — 1980–2000  not significant (index offenses)
Studies that do account for simultaneity
Study	 Data		 Estimated	percentage	change	in	crime	rates			
	 	 due	to	a	10%	increase	in	incarceration	rates
Levitt (1996)31 50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993 –3.8 (violent offenses) 
  –2.6 (property offenses) 
Spelman (2000)32 50 states and D.C. — 1971–1997 –4.0 (index offenses) 
Spelman (2005)33 254 Texas counties — 1990–2000 –4.4 (violent offenses) 
  –3.6 (property offenses)
table 1. Summary of Studies estimating the impact of incarceration rates on crime rates
eVAlUAtiNG the FiNdiNGS: the limitS oF reSeArch. All stud-
ies are not equal in design and value, of course. Different findings often arise 
because of crucially important methodological choices that researchers make 
and which the literature has only recently begun to address and settle. These 
include:
•  the choice of whether to study the relationship between incarceration 
and crime at the county, state, or national level (i.e., the level of aggrega-
tion used);34 
•  whether a study accounts for the fact that incarceration and crime 
occupy a two-way street in which each influences the other (i.e., whether 
an analysis controls for simultaneity); and 
•  the number of other factors affecting crime that a study takes into 
account (i.e., the specification of other factors potentially associated with 
crime rates). 
Such technical decisions can produce tremendous differences in results, lead-
ing researchers and policymakers to strikingly different conclusions.
On which findings should policymakers rely, then? “[I]f...results are to 
converge on a defensible estimate,” argues William Spelman, perhaps the 
leading researcher in this area, “[t]hey must measure effects at the lowest level 
of aggregation possible,” “account for simultaneity,” and control for as many 
other factors as possible.35 Accordingly, the most reliable studies are those con-
ducted at the state or county level that account for simultaneity and consider 
a significant number of crime-related factors. To date, only three studies—two 
by Spelman and one by Steven D. Levitt—include all three of these criteria.36 
Interestingly, all three have produced a fairly consistent finding, associating a 
10 percent higher incarceration rate with a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate.37 
Levitt’s and Spelman’s findings have garnered a great deal of attention from 
both supporters and opponents of a continued emphasis on incarceration. 
Supporters take the findings as a confirmation that prison works, concluding 
that every 10 percent increase in incarceration rates will produce a 2 to 4 per-
cent decrease in crime rates. Opponents, on the other hand, see the findings 
as a confirmation that prison does not work very well at all. They maintain that 
even a 4 percent decrease in crime is not much for a 10 percent increase in 
incarceration.38 Indeed, Spelman himself characterizes a 2 to 4 percent crime 
reduction as a fairly limited impact given the sizable financial obligation states 
have incurred in incarcerating so many people. 
An even more complex picture emerges from analyses focusing on the 
neighborhood level.39 A growing body of research examining specific neighbor-
hoods finds that more incarceration can actually lead to increasing crime rates.40 
Several recent studies maintain that communities may reach an incarceration 
“tipping point.” Dina Rose and Todd Clear, for example, found that the level of 
crime in several Florida communities increased after the incarceration rate of 
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Supporters take the findings 
as a confirmation that 
prison works, concluding 
that every 10 percent 
increase in incarceration 
rates will produce a 2 to 4 
percent decrease in crime 
rates. Opponents, on the 
other hand, see the findings 
as a confirmation that 
prison does not work very 
well at all.
individuals from those communities reached a certain level.41 Rose and Clear 
argue that high rates of imprisonment break down the social and family bonds 
that guide individuals away from crime, remove adults who would otherwise 
nurture children, deprive communities of income, reduce future income poten-
tial, and engender a deep resentment toward the legal system. As a result, as 
communities become less capable of maintaining social order through fami-
lies or social groups, crime rates go up.42
APPlyiNG the reSeArch FiNdiNGS: PerilS For Policy. Setting 
aside the possibility of such tipping points, even if a limited relationship 
between crime and incarceration were established, a precise ratio could not be 
applied to policymaking in every location. This is because empirical research 
on incarceration and crime is not meant to be a prescription for future impris-
onment policies at the local level, even though this is how some seek to use 
it. Research only provides an estimate of average relationships between incar-
ceration and crime rates across jurisdictions. Thus, such findings are a blunt 
instrument whose applicability to any specific jurisdiction is dubious.
Research, therefore, cannot predict the impact of future prison increases 
in a given state. What happens in any particular jurisdiction will depend on a 
variety of factors that have yet to be contemplated by crime and incarceration 
research. Some of these are environmental, such as social preferences, eco-
nomic changes, and political activity. Others are practical: the size of a state’s 
current prison population, the way offenders are sanctioned or incarcerated, 
and the types of offenders a state chooses to incarcerate. In the debate about 
the impact of incarceration on crime, such issues are generally overlooked by 
both sides and largely absent in the academic literature they draw upon. This 
is surprising given the practical influence these considerations can exert on 
the bigger issue of how crime and incarceration interact. The following brief 
discussion of each of these factors may help illustrate the limitations.
The size of a state’s prison population and crime rate will influence the impact 
of increases in incarceration rates. To date, most arguments for more incar-
ceration to further reduce crime have relied on Spelman’s estimate that a 10 
percent increase correlates with a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate. Even if that 
estimate is accurate, however, for a state with an already high incarceration rate 
the costs of increasing incarceration by 10 percent to achieve a 2 to 4 percent 
reduction in crime could be tremendous. For example, California and Nebraska 
had very similar crime rates in 2003 of approximately 4,000 index offenses 
The Size of State Prison Populations
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per 100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 2 to 4 percent reduction, 
California, with a prison population of 162,678 inmates, would have to incar-
cerate an additional 16,089 inmates.43 To achieve the same rate of reduction, 
Nebraska, with a prison population of 3,976, would have to incarcerate just 400 
additional inmates. If the average cost to incarcerate an offender for one year is 
$22,650, California would spend $355 million more than Nebraska to achieve 
the same level of public safety.44 The cost incurred per unit of crime reduction, 
then, is substantially larger for California. Thus, an increase in incarceration 
in a state with an already large prison population may require a huge boost in 
actual prison populations that may be difficult to sustain economically. 
Raymond Liedka, Anne Piehl, and Bert Useem have confirmed, moreover, 
that increases in prison populations in states with already large prison popula-
tions have less impact on crime than increases in states with smaller prison 
populations.45 States experience “accelerating declining marginal returns, that 
is, a percent reduction in crime that gets ever smaller with ever larger prison 
populations,” they argue.46 Thus, increases in incarceration rates are associated 
with lower crime rates at low levels of imprisonment, but the size of that asso-
ciation shrinks as incarceration rates get bigger. Eventually, they say, there is 
an “inflection point” where increases in incarceration rates are associated with 
higher crime rates. This inflection point occurs when a state’s incarceration 
rate reaches some point between 325 and 492 inmates per 100,000 people. In 
other words, states with incarceration rates above this range can expect to expe-
rience higher crime rates with future increases in incarceration rates. (This 
state-level phenomenon recalls the neighborhood effects of high incarceration 
rates cited by Rose and Clear.)
The Content of Punishment
Incarceration is not the only punishment that may reduce crime rates. Other 
types of punishment, including fines, probation, community service, drug 
treatment, or other sanctions have also been shown to suppress crime. These 
alternative sanctions are not considered in the crime control studies noted 
above, however. Had they increased at the same time as the expansion of impris-
onment, these sanctions may have contributed—in part or even completely—to 
the effects found in those studies. Similarly, the content of incarceration—the 
quality of inmates’ experience in prison—may matter greatly as well. Studies 
so far have only considered how the size of prison populations affects crime 
rates. Although some research has examined how related factors like the 
length of stay in prison or changes in supervision policies after release influ-
ence recidivism, no studies apparently have considered how or whether such 
factors affect crime rates. 
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The Types of Offenders in Prison
The type of offenders a state decides to incarcerate may also be a relevant factor. 
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins argue that continued expansion of the 
prison system does little more than increase the number of individuals in the 
criminal justice net without reducing criminal offending or crime rates.49 U.S. 
prisons already housed the most serious violent offenders in the early 1980s, 
they argue; prison expansion since then has resulted in nothing more than the 
imprisonment of large numbers of nonviolent, “marginal” offenders. Thus, 
since the worst offenders had already been incarcerated, Zimring and Hawkins 
contend that increasing incarceration rates through the 1990s did nothing to 
impact the crime rate. 
Others have noted as well that the increased incarceration of drug offend-
ers has helped reduce the effectiveness of incarceration.50 Between 1980 and 
2005, the number of inmates incarcerated for drug possession in state pris-
ons or local jails grew by more than 1,000 percent.51 By 2004, 419,000 drug 
possessors were incarcerated in state prisons or local jails at a cost of nearly 
$8.3 billion annually.52 Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt argue that the 
continued increase in the number of drug offenders in prisons may lead to a 
“crowding out” effect, in which the high number of incarcerated drug offenders 
prevents the incarceration of offenders prone to more serious crime, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of incarceration to reduce crime. 52a
Analysts agree with apparent unanimity that future increases in incarcera-
tion rates for such offenders will do less and cost more.53 Washington State, 
for example, concluded that while more incarceration has led to less crime 
in the state, the benefits of additional prison expansion will be smaller and 
more expensive to achieve.54 Specifically, an increase in the incarceration rate 
in 2003 prevented considerably fewer crimes than did previous similar-size 
increases. The state further concluded that while incarcerating violent and 
high-volume property offenders continued to generate more benefits than 
The research on crime rates has not examined the impact of prison-based 
programming, either. States vary a great deal in the amount and content of pro-
grams offered to inmates. A large body of literature has found that the design 
and content of specific programs can reduce individual recidivism rates.47 For 
example, drug treatments using therapeutic community models or rehabilita-
tive programs tailored to the risks and needs of offenders have been shown to 
reduce recidivism, while boot camps and unstructured rehabilitation programs 
have been found to have no positive influence on recidivism.48 Given this dem-
onstrated impact on recidivism, it stands to reason that programming during 
incarceration could also affect incarceration’s influence on crime rates.  
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costs, in the future each additional person incarcerated will result in fewer pre-
vented crimes. Washington even found that increasing the incarceration rate 
for drug offenders in the 1990s actually had a negative impact overall, as it 
now costs more to incarcerate additional drug offenders than the average value 
of the crimes prevented by their imprisonment. Money should not be the sole 
measure by which policymakers evaluate the effectiveness or attractiveness of 
a policy, of course. However, financial implications are a relevant concern of 
officials facing limited public resources and a seemingly endless list of areas in 
need of investment.
Estimating the Impact of Other 
Factors on Crime
Between 1990 and 2005, the crime rate in the United States fell dramatically to 
its lowest point in 30 years.55 However, as noted earlier, according to Spelman 
only 25 percent of this crime drop through the 1990s could be explained by 
increasing incarceration rates.56 The remaining 75 percent, therefore, must be 
due to factors other than incarceration. Indeed, researchers have identified a 
number of such factors including, for example, fewer young persons in the 
population, smaller urban populations, decreases in crack cocaine markets, 
lower unemployment rates, higher wages, more education and high school 
graduates, more police per capita, and more arrests for public order offenses.57 
An examination of just a few of these indicates that future investment in other 
policy areas may be not only more effective but also more cost effective than 
continued investment in increased prison populations (see Table 2). 
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PoliciNG. Several authors have found an association between increases in 
the number of police per capita and lower crime rates. For example, using city-
level data, Levitt found that a 10 percent increase in the size of a city’s police 
force was associated with an 11 percent lower violent crime rate and a 3 per-
cent lower property crime rate.58 Thomas Marvel and Carlisle Moody similarly 
found a 10 percent increase in the size of a city’s police force associated with 
a 3 percent reduction in index crime rates.59 Using county-level data, Tomislav 
Kovandzic and John J. Sloan also found associations between the size of police 
forces and crime, concluding that a 10 percent increase in the number of 
police was associated with a 1.4 percent lower index crime rate.60 At the state-
level, however, Marvel and Moody found no association between the size of the 
police force and crime rates. This disparate finding suggests that the impact of 
increased police presence may be felt only at the local level.61 
Using Marvel and Moody’s estimate tying a 10 percent increase in the size 
of a city’s police force to a 3 percent decrease in the index crime rate, we can 
imagine how a crime reduction policy focusing on policing might operate in, 
say, New York City, where the 2004 index crime rate was 2,800 offenses per 
100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 3 percent reduction in the crime 
rate by increasing incarceration, New York City—with a prison population of 
33,564 inmates—would have to incarcerate an additional 3,300 inmates at a 
cost of approximately $121.5 million per year.62, 63 With a police force of 39,110 
sworn police officers, the city could achieve the same reduction in crime by 
hiring 3,911 more police officers at a cost of $97.2 million per year.64, 65 Com-
pared to policing, then, incarceration would cost the city $24.3 million more to 
achieve the same level of public safety.66
It is important to note that in the same way the content of incarceration 
policy may affect how imprisonment relates to crime, so too may the content 
of policing policy influence how crime develops. Poorly structured policing 
policies could negate the positive potential of an increase in officers. Also, an 
increase in the number of police would not necessarily translate directly into 
more law enforcement and arrests. Provided such concerns are taken into 
account, however, this example illustrates the promise of increasing policing 
as an alternative to increasing incarceration.67
UNemPloymeNt ANd WAGeS. Incarceration, employment, and income 
interact on several levels in the United States. Incarceration creates problems 
of low earnings and irregular employment for individuals after release from 
prison by dissuading employers from hiring them, disqualifying them from 
certain professions, eroding job skills, limiting acquisition of work experi-
ence, creating behaviors inconsistent with work routines outside prison, and 
undermining social connections to good job opportunities.68 Research has 
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Future investment 
in other policy areas may 
be not only more effective 
but also more cost effective 
than continued investment 
in increased prison 
populations.
Police per capita
Study	 Data		 Estimated	percentage	change	in	crime	rates		 	
	 	 due	to	a	10%	increase	in	indicator
Marvell and Moody (1996) 56 U.S. cities — 1971–1992 –3 (index offenses)
 
Marvell and Moody (1996) 49 states — 1971–1992  not significant (index offenses) 
Levitt (1997) 59 U.S. cities — 1970–1992
 –11 (violent offenses) 
  –3 (property offenses)
Kovandzic and Sloan  (2002) 57 Florida counties — 1980–1998 –1.4 (index offenses) 
Unemployment rate
Study	 Data		 Estimated	percentage	change	in	crime	rates		 	
	 	 due	to	a	10%	increase	in	indicator
Levitt (1996)83 50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993  not significant (violent offenses) 
  10 (property offenses)
Levitt (1997) 59 U.S. cities — 1970–1992  not significant (violent offenses) 
  10.4 (property offenses)
Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer (2001) 50 states — 1971–1997  not significant (violent offenses) 
  16.3 (property offenses)
Gould et al. (2002) 705 counties — 1979–1997 not significant (violent offenses) 
  16.6 (property offenses)
real Wages
Study	 Data		 Estimated	percentage	change	in	crime	rates		 	
	 	 due	to	a	10%	increase	in	indicator
Gould et al. (2002) 705 counties — 1979–1997
 –25.3 (violent offenses) 
  –12.6 (property offenses)
  –13.5 (index offenses)
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) 50 states — 1971–1997 –1.6 (violent offenses)
  not significant (property offenses)
Grogger (1998) Individual survey data (1980) –10 (index offenses)
high School Graduation rate
Study	 Data		 Estimated	percentage	change	in	crime	rates		 	
	 	 due	to	a	10%	increase	in	indicator
Lochner and Moretti (2004) 50 states — 1960, 1970, 1980 –9.4 (index offenses)
table 2. Summary of Studies estimating the impact of other Social Factors on crime rates
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shown that men with criminal records experience no growth in earnings and, 
therefore, have few choices other than day labor.69 At the community level, 
neighborhoods with high incarceration rates may be shunned by employers. 
Further, as John Hagan argues, incarceration can generate social connections 
to illegal rather than legal employment, thus, potentially increasing crime.70
Indeed, researchers have found that economic shifts have significantly 
affected crime rates in the last decade. Using state-level data, Steven Raphael 
and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer found that a 10 percent decrease in a state’s unem-
ployment rate corresponded with a 16 percent reduction in property crime rates; 
the researchers concluded that, between 1992 and 1997, “slightly more than 
40 percent of the decline [in the overall property crime rate] can be attributed 
to the decline in unemployment.”71 Liedka, Piehl, and Useem produced simi-
lar findings, also using state-level data.72 Analyses using county-level data have 
produced estimates that find a similar association between unemployment and 
crime; Eric Gould, Bruce Weinberg, and David Mustard, for example, found 
that a 10 percent reduction in unemployment rates was associated with a 16.6 
percent reduction in property crime.73 Both studies found no association, how-
ever, between unemployment and violent crime.74 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
conclude that “the magnitudes of the crime-unemployment effects...suggest 
that policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of workers facing 
the greatest obstacles can be effective tools for combating crime.”75
Research has also considered the relationship between real wages and 
crime. Using national-level data, Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard determined 
that a 10 percent increase in real wages saw a 13 percent lower index crime 
rate—specifically, a 12 percent lower property crime rate and a 25 percent lower 
violent crime rate.76 At the state level, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer found that a 
10 percent increase in per capita income saw a 1.6 percent lower violent crime 
rate; Liedka, Piehl, and Useem found similar associations at the state level.77 
Using individual-level data, Jeffrey Grogger found that a 10 percent increase in 
real wages was associated with a 10 percent decrease in crime participation at 
the individual level.78 In examining the crime drop of the 1990s, Grogger and 
Michael Willis suggested that a better economy allowed more young people 
opportunities in the labor market rather than in crime. They attributed the 
crime drop largely to the expanding economy.79 
edUcAtioN. The link between crime and education has also begun to 
attract research attention. Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, for example, 
have shown an increase in citizens’ education levels to be associated with lower 
crime rates: specifically, a one-year increase in the average education of citi-
zens results in a 1.7 percent lower index crime rate. In addition, they associated 
a 10 percent increase in graduation rates with a 9.4 percent lower index crime 
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rate. Combined with Gould and his colleagues’ findings on the link between 
wages and crime, Lochner and Moretti argue that “a 10 percent increase in 
high school graduation rates should reduce arrest rates by 5 to 10 percent 
through increased wages alone.”80 “[A] 1 percent increase in male high school 
graduation rates would save as much as $1.4 billion” nationally through crime 
reduction, they conclude.81 
Moreover, prison-based education programs have been found to signifi-
cantly reduce recidivism rates for offenders after release.82 In their recent 
examination of the effects of prison education participation across three states, 
researchers Stephen Steurer, Linda Smith, and Alice Tracy did not consider the 
impact of such education programs on overall crime rates, but their findings of 
significantly reduced recidivism for individuals who participated in such pro-
grams underscore the impact of education on reentry success.
Beyond Incarceration 
Given the demonstrated influence of these other factors on crime and the 
decreasing impact of incarceration, criminal justice policymakers appear to have 
placed undue emphasis on incarceration. As William Spelman has cautioned, “It 
is no longer sufficient, if it ever was, to demonstrate that prisons are better than 
nothing. Instead, they must be better than the next-best use of the money.”84  
Yet, in the past two decades, spending on these other factors has been cut. 
Corrections expenditures were the only state budget category other than Med-
icaid to increase as a percentage of total state spending over the past 20 years.85 
Between 1985 and 2004, states increased corrections spending by 202 per-
cent. By comparison, spending on higher education grew by just 3 percent, 
Medicaid by 47 percent, and secondary and elementary education by 55 per-
cent; spending on public assistance decreased by more than 60 percent during 
the same period (see Figure 1).86 Public opinion appears to be in harmony with 
a move away from incarceration spending. Whereas 75 percent of Americans 
believed that too little money was spent on halting rising crime rates in 1994, 
by 2002, this had declined to 56 percent. In contrast, during the same period 
the proportion of Americans responding that too little money was spent on 
welfare increased from 13 percent to 21 percent.87 
Such approaches are not new to criminal justice policy discussions. Many 
commentators have argued for a crime reduction policy that focuses on the 
labor market by addressing employment, wages, and education.89 In the lim-
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ited areas where such policies have been implemented, they have targeted 
individuals believed to be at high risk of crime involvement, such as high 
school dropouts, inner-city youth, offenders, and ex-offenders. But a broader 
approach would require a shift in criminal justice policy away from reactive 
responses to criminal offending and toward a proactive attempt to address the 
underlying causes of criminal offending. It also requires a more general shift 
in policymaking attitudes toward the view that public safety may best be served 































Figure 1. Percentage change in State Spending, 1985-2004
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n = TOUGHER RESPONSES TO CRIME
n = ADDRESS THE CAUSES OF CRIMEFigure . Public Support for Approaches to crime, 1994 and 2001
Moreover, the public favors a policy that addresses the underlying causes of 
crime rather than simply responds to crime after it occurs. Polling by Peter D. 
Hart Research Associates, for example, shows the public questioning whether 
incarceration is the best crime control policy. In 1994, 42 percent of Ameri-
cans favored responding to crime with stricter sentencing; by 2001, this had 
decreased to just 32 percent. Conversely, in 1994, only 48 percent of Ameri-
cans said they favored addressing the underlying causes of crime; by 2001, this 
had increased to 65 percent (see Figure 2).88
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Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, State Expenditure Reports annual series. Source: Peter D. Hart and Associates.
Toward a New Approach to Public Safety
After 15 years of declining crime rates, many analysts are claiming that “prison 
works.” But, as Elliot Currie notes, “if ‘prison works’ is the answer, what was 
the question?”90 If the question is whether it is possible to prevent individu-
als from committing crimes by putting them in prison, then prison certainly 
works; it works to punish and incapacitate those who have committed crimes. 
But if the question is what is the best way to reduce crime, “prison works” 
may not be the most helpful response. Does a five-year prison sentence “work” 
better to reduce crime than a two-year prison sentence? Does a two-year prison 
sentence for nonviolent offenders “work” as well as a two-year prison sentence 
for violent offenders? 
The most salient question of all may be, Do the resources devoted to prison 
“work” better to ensure public safety than if those resources were devoted to 
something else?91 Prisons are not the only way to fight crime. Policymakers 
could spend money on more judges, better staffed or equipped law enforce-
ment, or better-trained probation and parole officers. They could invest, as this 
paper indicates, in other, non-criminal-justice areas shown to affect crime: edu-
cation, employment, economic development, etc. The impact of incarceration 
on crime is limited and diminishing. The public’s support for reactive crime 
control is also in decline. It is therefore fitting that we reconsider the continued 
emphasis on and dedication of resources to incarceration.
Public safety cannot be achieved only by responding to crime after it 
occurs; research shows that it may also depend on protecting people against 
those factors that have been shown to be associated with high crime rates, 
such as unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy. By pursuing crime reduction 
chiefly through incarceration, states are forgoing the opportunity to invest in 
these other important areas. As state policymakers continue to feel pressure 
to introduce measures to keep crime rates low, they would therefore do well to 
look beyond incarceration for alternative policies that not only may be able to 
accomplish the important task of protecting public safety, but may do so more 
efficiently and more effectively.
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